This article explores the limits of replacing humans with artificial intelligence as free-willed agents and its challenge to free will in Islamic theological anthropology. Using a comparative descriptive-analytical method, the study examines human agency in Ash’arism, Mu’tazilism, and Imami theology, testing these frameworks against contemporary AI. The research’s novelty lies in evaluating whether AI can be considered a volitional agent subject to moral and religious obligation (taklif). It proposes the “Simulation Fallacy” as an interpretive framework to distinguish between simulating decision-making patterns and realizing existential, conscious will. The study concludes that algorithmic complexity and decision-mimicking behaviors do not prove AI possesses free will in the theological sense. Despite their doctrinal differences, all three schools agree on the absence of necessary ontological components for genuine agency in machines, whether concerning acquisition (kasb), capacity (istita’ah), or immaterial consciousness. Consequently, AI does not undermine human uniqueness but reveals a confusion between functional similarity and existential identity. Thus, moral and legal responsibility remains exclusively human, while machines remain tools, not subjects, within ethics and theology.
Keywords:Artificial Intelligence; Free Will; Islamic Theology (Kalam); Ash’arism; Mu’tazilism; Imami Theology; Moral Agency; Theological Anthropology.
Abstract
This article examines whether artificial intelligence (AI) can replace human beings as free-willed agents and whether it constitutes a genuine challenge to the concept of free will in Islamic theological anthropology. Using a descriptive-analytical method within a comparative framework, the study analyzes the understanding of will, choice, and human agency in three major schools of Islamic theology: Ash’arism, Mu’tazilism, and Imami theology. It then evaluates the extent to which these classical formulations can be applied to contemporary AI systems. The originality of the research lies in moving beyond the historical exposition of theological views on action and choice to assess a modern claim that has received insufficient attention in previous studies: the possibility of regarding AI as a volitional agent or as a subject capable of moral and religious accountability (taklif). To address this issue, the article proposes the concept of the “Simulation Fallacy,” which distinguishes between the simulation of decision-making patterns and the actual realization of conscious, existential will. The study concludes that the complexity of algorithms and AI’s ability to generate behavior resembling human decision-making do not suffice to establish genuine free will in the theological sense. Although the three schools differ in their metaphysical and anthropological foundations, they converge on the absence of the ontological prerequisites necessary for true voluntary agency in machines, whether defined through kasb, istita’ah, or conscious self-awareness. Accordingly, AI does not undermine the anthropological distinction of the human being; rather, it exposes a confusion between functional similarity and existential identity. Moral and religious responsibility remains confined to human beings, not machines.
Introduction
The rapid development of artificial intelligence has brought new philosophical and theological questions to the forefront of contemporary discourse. AI systems can now perform tasks that resemble human reasoning, learning, prediction, and even creative production. This remarkable capacity has led some observers to ask whether AI merely imitates intelligence or whether it can be regarded as an autonomous agent with its own will. Such a question is not only technical but deeply anthropological and theological, because it touches the meaning of responsibility, intentionality, and human uniqueness.
Within Islamic theology, the concept of human agency has always been central. The doctrine of moral accountability (taklif) presupposes a being capable of knowledge, intention, and choice. Human actions have been discussed extensively in classical kalam, especially in relation to divine omnipotence and human freedom. However, these discussions were always framed with reference to human beings as conscious and accountable subjects. The emergence of AI creates a new context in which the classical categories must be re-examined. Can a machine that imitates decision-making be considered a moral agent? Or does the appearance of choice in AI conceal a deeper ontological absence? This article addresses these questions through a comparative study of Ash’arite, Mu’tazilite, and Imami approaches to human will.
Materials & Methods
This research adopts a descriptive-analytical methodology within a comparative theological framework. The main material consists of the doctrinal positions of the three major schools of Islamic theology concerning human action, will, and responsibility. In the Ash’arite school, the theory of kasb is examined as a model of agency in which God creates acts while human beings acquire them. In the Mu’tazilite school, attention is given to the doctrine of human autonomy and the necessity of free choice for divine justice. In the Imami school, the principle of amr bayn al-amrayn is analyzed as a mediating view that preserves both divine sovereignty and meaningful human responsibility.
The study then applies these theological concepts to contemporary AI by examining the structural features of algorithmic systems, including machine learning, neural networks, and predictive modeling. The analytical focus is on three criteria: awareness, intentionality, and capacity for genuine choice. By comparing theological definitions of volition with the operational logic of AI, the study assesses whether machine behavior can be interpreted as real agency or only as sophisticated simulation.
Discussion & Result
The findings indicate that AI cannot be considered a genuine voluntary agent in the theological sense. Although AI systems can generate outputs that resemble human decisions, their behavior is ultimately produced through programmed processes, statistical correlations, and externally imposed data structures. This means that AI does not possess self-consciousness, moral awareness, or existential responsibility.
A key contribution of this study is the introduction of the “Simulation Fallacy.” This concept refers to the error of confusing the simulation of a process with the actual possession of the underlying reality. In the case of AI, the appearance of decision-making should not be mistaken for authentic will. Functional resemblance does not imply ontological equivalence.
From an Ash’arite perspective, AI cannot be the locus of kasb because it lacks the conscious subjectivity that makes acquisition meaningful. In the Mu’tazilite framework, AI cannot be a moral agent because it does not possess rational self-determination or ethical awareness. In the Imami view, AI also fails to satisfy the requirements of amr bayn al-amrayn, since this doctrine presupposes a conscious and responsible self. Despite their differences, all three schools agree that true agency requires an ontological condition that machines do not possess.
The result of this analysis is clear: AI may simulate choice, but it does not exercise freedom. Its behavior is a product of code, data, and design, not will, intention, or accountability. Therefore, AI cannot bear moral or religious responsibility. Any ethical implications of AI use must be attributed to the human beings who design, deploy, and supervise it.
Conclusion
This study has shown that artificial intelligence does not constitute a challenge to the Islamic theological concept of free will in any strong ontological sense. Although AI systems are increasingly capable of mimicking human cognition and decision-making, they remain fundamentally distinct from human beings as conscious, accountable, and morally responsible agents. The comparative analysis of Ash’arism, Mu’tazilism, and Imami theology demonstrates that, despite their doctrinal differences, these schools converge on the view that genuine agency requires consciousness, intentionality, and a capacity for accountability that machines do not possess.
Accordingly, the attribution of moral or religious responsibility to AI is conceptually misplaced. The machine may be intelligent in a functional sense, but it is not free in the theological sense. The human being remains the only subject of taklif. Far from undermining human distinctiveness, AI highlights the importance of distinguishing between operational complexity and existential freedom. Future research should further explore the ethical responsibility of human designers and the theological implications of increasingly autonomous technologies.